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TRAINING (over)  
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Acting Chief, Administrative Staff

29 October 1960

Chief, Geographic Research

Comments on the Inspector General's Survey of the CIA Training Program, August 1960

1. It's too bad that the Inspector General's team investigating training in CIA has not been able to rise to a level of objectivity in examining the DD/I training requirements vs. the training programs offered by the Office of Training. The report seems evidence enough to conclude that the IG's team has been thoroughly indoctrinated and convinced that the only answer to training for all Agency personnel is through the JOT Program. Actually, it appears that they are striving to wed JOT training with all Agency recruitment to satisfy all Agency requirements for professional officers.

2. Junior Officer Trainees have not been recruited to meet the professional requirements of the Geographic Area. One of the areas of misunderstanding no doubt relates to the exercise of judgement in the initial recruitment of a substantively competent individual. I for one -- and I believe others in the DD/I -- would be extremely reluctant to delegate this responsibility to professional recruitment or any team effort where there is a lack of substantive background for cracking in all of the judgments involved in the final selection of personnel. I believe that recruitment under the control of the JOT system would inevitably become stereotyped by its concentration on the bright young "generalist" who seems to have tremendous potential for intelligence. Most of the intelligence production program in the Area would fail miserably if we had to rely upon general intelligence officers. The administration in GRR is best equipped at the moment to select the people it needs to carry on its substantive program.

3. The Inspector General's report, in criticizing GRR's approach to meet its recruitment and training requirements, makes reference to earlier attempts to classify the economist, geographer, and scientist outside the profession of intelligence. Out of this is created an issue for the DD/I to determine whether to develop the specialist intelligence officer with or without training in intelligence. There seems to be a need for a real effort to clarify what is meant by the profession of intelligence as it applies to various parts of the Agency. All parties need to come to an understanding that the profession of intelligence in the DD/I is quite different from that of the DD/P or the DD/B. One possible counter-proposal to the IG's recommendation is that recruitment

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continue to be done outside of the JOEP and that, once professional officers are employed, they be sent immediately to an intelligence school of several months' duration for the purpose of indoctrination in the intelligence organizations and processes of the entire community with special attention given to CIA. This would be an enlargement of the three-week Intelligence Orientation Course which is now given. This might eliminate the carrying over the fact that ORR is not in the same training mold with the DD/P, but is interested in developing its own kind of professional intelligence officer.

4. The content of Paragraph I. on page 146 seems to be indicative of the illusions of the IG's team in dealing with DD/I training. In the pattern of training that is summarized in this paragraph for the Clandestine Services, they are more than willing to lump in the DD/I as a way of meeting DD/I training needs. This suggests a deep-seated conviction that all real intelligence effort takes place in the DD/P and that any other effort can only be seen through those eyes. If the Inspector General's team had spent as much time analyzing the training problems of the DD/I as they obviously did for the DD/P element, the report would probably have reflected this and their requirements would have been more consistent with DD/I needs than with DD/P precedent.

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